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1. that pigs occupy a vastly lower moral status, and
rightly command significantly less moral
consideration and respect, than do human beings;

Response:
Of Pigs and
Primitive Notions

2. that nominally similar wrongs done to pigs and
to humans are for that reason not at all morally
comparable;
3. that it is therefore not morally wrong even in
the same way, let alone to the same degree, to
prevent a pig from meeting its basic biological
needs as to visit nominally the same evil on a
human being; and
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Purdue University/Calumet
I agree with Gary Comstock's conclusion that Ilu:
research program at Beltsville is not morally justified.
Moreover, I have no substantial disagreement with the
demils of his clear, closely-reasoned argument.
However, it seems to me that two aspects of
Comstock's argument call for further consideration and
commentary, both because of their intrinsic philosophical interest and because they are the points in the
argument most likely to be rejected by those predisposed
to approve of the Beltsville project. I have in mind

4. that it is therefore perfectly acceptable to prevent
a pig from meeting its basic biological needs in
order to bring about a legitimate and not
inconsequential benefit to human beings, even if
Illis benefit is merely an economic one of the
magnitude promised by the Beltsville program.
In short, according to this way of thinking, with its
emphasis on the allegedly reduced moral status of pigs
in comparison to that of humans, tlle Beltsville program
is perfectly justified.
Comstock, of course, is aware that the issue of
morally relevant differences between pigs and humans
is crucial to his disagreement witll his philosophical
opponents. After all, immediately after arguing that
no one would consider the economic benefits promised
by the Beltsville program sufficient to render it morally
permissible to treat humans the way pigs are treated
in that program, he goes on to remark that "of course,
the experimental animals are hogs, not humans."
However, his worry in bringing this up is Illat "it is
not apparent to everyone Illat hogs have what most
children have, namely, the capacity to take an interest
in their welfare." He seems to assume that if his
opponents can be brought to see that pigs take the same
sort of interest in having their own basic biological
needs met as humans take in seeing their own
biological needs met, these opponents will then have
to acknowledge that the same sort of wrong is
committed whenever a being which takes an interest
in its welfare is prevented from meeting its basic
biological needs, whether that being is a pig or a
human. It is for Illis reason, apparently, that Comstock
calls his claim that pigs do take an interest in Illeir
own welfare "the crux of my argument."

1. Comstock's claim that "it is morally wrong, in
the same way if not to Ille same degree, to deprive
an animal of living conditions in which its basic
biological needs can be met, as to deprive a
human of living conditions in which its basic
biological needs can be met," and
2. His appeal to the concept of a "primitive notion"
as part of his defense of (1).
Let us begin with (1). I think nearly everyone would
go along with Comstock to the point of agreeing that it
would be wrong to prevent a pig from meeting its basic
biological needs for no reason at all, or for some ignoble
reason such as getting sadistic kicks from doing so, or
for the purpose of achieving some fantastically
inconsequential, though otherwise legitimate, human
benefit. However, a very widespread opinion holds
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My own sense, on the contrary, is that a good many
people who quite readily concede that pigs have
interests, and indeed who concede even that, at least
when dealing with matters as elementary and
uncomplicated as basic biological needs, pigs take the
same kind of interest with respect to themselves as
human beings do with respect to themselves,
nonetheless feel that to thwart an animal's interest is
not even close to being morally on a par with thwarting
a human being's relatively similar interest. The reason
is simply that animals, on the view I am now
considering, occupy such a vastly reduced moral status
in comparison to that of human beings that nominally
similar wrongs done to animals and to humans should
in fact be regarded as qualitatively different kinds of
wrongs; indeed, if the "wrong" done to the animal is
necessary to the furtherance of some legitimate human
benefit, it should not, on this view, be considered a
"wrong" at all.
One can distinguish two different strategies which
have been used widely in attempts to justify the alleged
radical difference between humans and other animals
with regard to their respective levels of moral status.!
One strategy consists of attempting to isolate some
feature or cluster of features held in common by all
human beings, but not held by any nonhuman animals,
and then claiming tllat any being who lacks this feature
or cluster of features is, morally speaking, a secondclass citizen at best, or a moral nonentity at worst. TIms,
various tllinkers have appealed to such features as
rationality, mastery of a language, possession of an
immortal soul, the ability to reflect, and so on, either
individually or collectively, as features a being must
have in order to count substantially in moral deliberation
and a5 features which, as it turns out, human beings,
but no other animals, possess. 2
In my judgment, this strategy cannot succeed. It
faces at least two powerful and fundamental objections.
The first of tllese has been much-discussed and is
sometimes called "the problem of marginal humans."
The problem is that the defender of this strategy faces a
dilemma. Either the conditions to be met in order for a
being to enjoy full moral status will be set high enough
to exclude all nonhuman animals, in which case some
severely mentally-enfeebled humans-those who are
severely retarded or brain-damaged, for example-will
fail to make tlle cut, or else the threshold will be set
low enough to include all humans, in which case many
animals will have to be included as well.
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To be fair, I must acknowledge that several attempts
to meet this objection have been put forward. For
example, it has been argued that the features characteristically possessed by members of the group to which
an individual belongs are of greater moral relevance
than the features possessed by the individual in question
or that we can supplement a high, individually-oriented,
standard of inclusion into the realm of full moral status
with an appeal to our natural sympatlly for less fortunate
members of our own species. 3
I find these attempts miserably ad hoc and utterly
implausible. To begin with the first attempt, surely it is
not the case that features characteristically held within
a group are of greater moral relevance than features
actually held by the specific individuals in question. If
tall people are typically better at basketball than short
people, does that justify giving a basketball-playing job
to a tall but inept basketball player over a short but
highly talented one? If men are typically better than
women at some task, does that justify hiring a specific
man over a specific woman, when she, in this instance,
can do the job more capably? And with regard to the
other attempt to escape this difficulty, do we really want
to let our natural sympathies play such an important
role in our ethics? Here I think it is quite proper to make
tlle much-criticized point that since we would never
tolerate such a move with regard to justifying our
differing treatment of individuals on the basis of their
race or sex, we also should not do so in connection
with the treatment of individuals on the basis of their
species-membership. 4
The other fundamental objection to tlle strategy of
attempting to isolate some feature or set of features held
in common by all humans but no nonhuman animals,
so as to include the fonner and exclude the latter from
the realm of full moral status, consists in questioning
the moral relevance of the proposed feature or set of
features. Consider, for example, the idea that what
places human beings on a special moral plane is the
fact that they, uniquely, can communicate in language.
The obvious reply is that while this feature of human
experience is morally relevant in some situations, it is
obviously not in others. Thus, while tlle fact that a given
pig can neither read nor write nor speak in a language
provides an excellent reason to deny the pig admission
to study in a university, it is far from clear how its
linguistic capacities are relevant to the question of tlle
moral legitimacy of causing the pig physical pain. Here,
to cite once again Jeremy Bentham's famous line, "tlle
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question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk?
but, Can they sufjer?"s
Some might conclude at tJlis point tJlat only a ratJler
modest, animal-including criterion of inclusion into tJle
realm of full moral status-for example, sentience,
rather tJlan linguistic competence or rationality-should
be adopted, since it is of more obvious moral relevance
to a greater number of situations tJlan are its competitors.
However, an alternative conclusion would be that there
simply is no single feature, or single set of features,
that is always exhaustively relevant in any situation to
determining who should, and who should not, be given
full moral consideration in that situation. The point is
simply that the characteristics which are relevant to one
situation are not always tJlOse which are relevant to
another, so one cannot point to any single set of
characteristics that some beings might share and declare
them the unique and sufficient determiners of moral
status. James Rachels explains this clearly:

difference between individuals is relevant to
justifying a difference in treatment, we must
know what sort of treatment is at issue.... 6
As a corollary to this conclusion, Rachels draws
another: "namely, that there is no one big difference
between individuals that is relevant to justifying all
differences in treatment."? It seems to me that this
provides just what we need to show that Comstock is
right to conclude that the wrong done to pigs when they
are prevented from having their basic biological needs
met is similar, if not identical, to the wrong done to
human beings when they are made to suffer tJmt fate.
Comstock's opponents will want to argue that the
difference in moral status between pigs and human
beings is crucial here and, at least according to the
strategy which I am now considering, that this crucial
difference in moral status stems from differences in
rationality, or linguistic competence, or the like, between
the two species. However, as the argument borrowed
from Rachels clearly shows, no such move can possibly
succeed unless these admitted differences between pigs
and humans can be shown to be relevant to the issue of
the thwarting of basic biological needs. But the very
fact that these needs are basic-not advanced and thus
requiring advanced capacities-and biological-rather
than cultural or intellectual-indicates that the advanced
capacities which distinguish most humans from pigs
are of minimal relevance to the moral evaluation of the
treatment handed out in the Beltsville program. The
harm done to tJle Beltsville pigs hurts them in a way
that is quite comparable to the way in which such
treatment would hurt humans, were they subjected to
it. And this treatment violates the interests of the
Beltsville pigs much in the same way that it would
violate tJle interests of comparably-treated humans.
Thus, since there is probably a consensus that such
treaunent would be indefensible if directed at humans,
how can it be defended in connection WitJl pigs?
This brings me to tJle second of the two major
strategies which have been widely used in attempts to
defend the idea that nonhuman animals should be
regarded as occupying only a radically reduced level
of moral status in comparison to that enjoyed by
humans. This strategy consists of the simple declaration
tJlat the rightness of assigning a privileged moral status
to human beings is intuitively evident-that it possesses
a kind of deep obviousness which renders argument
unnecessary and that it certainly possesses a greater

A difference between individuals that justifies

one sort of difference in treatment might be
completely irrelevant to justifying another
difference in treatment. .. [SJuppose tJle lawschool admissions committee accepts one
applicant but rejects another. Asked to justify
this, they explain that the first applicant had
excellent college grades and test scores, while
the second applicant had a miserable record.
Or suppose [aJ doctor treats two patients
differentJy: he gives one a shot of penicillin,
and puts the other's arm in a plaster cast.
Again, this can be justified by pointing to a
relevant difference between them: the first
patient had an infection while the second had
a broken arm.
But now suppose we switch tJlings around.
Suppose the law school admissions committee
is asked to justify admitting A while rejecting
B, and replies that A had an infection but B
had a broken arm. Or suppose tJle doctor is
asked to justify giving A a shot of penicillin,
while putting B'S arm in a cast, and replies
that A had better college grades and test scores.
Both replies are, of course, silly, for it is clear
that what is relevant in the one context is
irrelevant in the other. The obvious point is
that, before we can determine whether a
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in our discussions and arguments with one another. We
do not notice tllese assumptions because we are rarely
motivated to question them or refer to them, their
obviousness being such that neither we nor our
interlocutors are often called on to question them, and
tlleir basicality being such that tlley are remote from
the higher-level, more complex disputes which usually
engage our attention.
But in the context of the present debate, this appeal
to intuition, or to "primitive notions," has to be
addressed since tlle appeal is being made on behalf of
opposite conclusions. Recall that, for Comstock, it is a
primitive notion that "it is wrong to deprive a ,being
that can take an interest in having its basic biological
needs met of tlle things it needs to have its basic
biological needs met." Since pigs can take an interest
in having tlleir basic biological needs met, it follows
that tlle Beltsville program is wrong. But otller thinkers
invoke intuition in order to argue tllat human interests
are what really count from a moral standpoint, even if
we cannot give any cogent argument on behalf of
denying similar consideration to animals' interests. For
example, consider the words of C. A. J. Coady in his
essay, "Defending Human Chauvinism":

degree of obviousness than does any of tlle proposed
arguments attempting to overturn it. To be sure, one
might ask for supporting arguments anyway, in spite of
the alleged obviousness of tlle claim in question. But if
no such arguments can be found which can stand up to
scrutiny, this need not imply that we should abandon
the claim, and this is so because of the very logic of
justification. So what is to stop us from claiming tllat
the moral rightness of giving radical priority to human
interests over those of otller animals whenever tlley
conflict is simply intuitively evident, a "primitive
notion," to use Comstock's phrase? Notice that if we
can legitimately make this move, we presumably have
all we need in order to defend the Beltsville progranl.
But can we legitimately make this move?
It is important to note that Comstock is not in a
position to make a quick, principled rejection of tllis
move, since he makes a similar one on behalf of his
claim that "it is wrong to deprive a being that can take
an interest in having its basic biological needs met of
the things it needs to have its basic biological needs
met." Comstock asserts that this latter claim is a
"primitive notion," by which he apparently means a
notion that is so basic and fundanlental that it cannot
be grounded or justified by appealing to anything else
even more basic or fundamental, but which is at the
same time so obvious that nothing beyond mere
clarification and vivification is needed to render tlle
notion acceptable to all minimally rational and welladjusted persons.
My own argument in support of Comstock's use of
the concept of "primitive notions," and one which I
tllink is consistent with the spirit of his own defense of
it, runs as follows. If I tell you that I believe A, you
might justly ask me why, in which case I would invoke
B in support of A. But suppose that you do not readily
accept B. 11len I could cite C. and argue tllat it implies
B. Should you then prove unwilling to accept C, I might
appeal to D, and so on, but clearly tllis must come to a
stop somewhere. It would seem, then, that for any
argument to get off tlle ground it must be possible either
to assume or eventually to find starting points which
all parties to tlle discussion can accept. I cannot see
any way around this analysis. Indeed, it seems to me
that it holds for all arguments whatever, on all subjects.
The only reason we are not more aware of this, I suggest,
is that
a practical matter we all do indeed share a
large number of "obvious" assumptions in common and
that these rarely emerge as objects of explicit attention

It will be said that the idea that there is
something specially morally important about
human beings needs justification...but I'm not
sure that it has to be [justi~ied]. There are
various ground floor considerations in ethics
as in any other enterprise-for an animal
liberationist such things as the "intrinsic good"
of pleasure and the "intrinsic evil" of pain are
usually ground floor. No further justification
is given for tllem, or needed. It is not clear to
me tlmt membership in the human species does
not function in a similarly fundamental way
in ethics so that there is as much absurdity, if
not more, in asking "Why does it matter
morally that she is human?" as in asking "Why
does it matter morally that she is in painT's
How, then, do we choose between Comstock's
primitive notion and Coady's ground floor consideration? Are the two on equal footing? Must our choice
between them be made simply arbitrarily?
I think not. I come down firmly on Comstock's side,
and I do not consider my choice the slightest bit
arbitrary. By way of explanation, I offer three points.

as
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to me to be the case with regard to the issue of the degree
of importance to which consideratlonsof animals'
interests should be given in our moral deliberations.
Consider that, while it would be quite shocking to learn
of a culture in which misery is greatly prized for its
own sake, it does not even surprise us to read of cultures
which assign to animals a radically different moral
status, whether higher or lower, ilian Umt which we
assign to iliem.
Finally, I would point out iliat while our opposed
fundamental judgments-that misery as such is bad and
that it is seriously bad only when suffered by humansare boili widely held, it is possible in ilie case of ilie
lat~r, but not the former, to explain ilie l?PpulqriJypf
tlle judgment by appealing to someiliing other tllan its
evidentness. I refer to ilie simple point-anoilier to
which intuitionists WOUld. be well~advised to pay
persistent attention-tlmt the latter judgment, unlike ilie
former, is self-serving, benefitting the relatively
powerful humans who make the judgment, at ilie
expense of ilie relatively powerless aIlimals, .w4o have
'
,"
no say in the matter. 9
In conclusion, I reaffirm' my ac~ept~I1ce of
Comstock's conclusion and of ilie major details of his
argument. I have here attempted onlytostrengilien ilial
argument by defending two of its most controversial
moves against ilie objections iliey are likely to generat~
in ilie minds of iliose who would defend ilieBeltsvill~
research program:
.

First, it does indeed seem to me powerfully evident,
from my own experience and from renection on that
experience, that, for example, happiness is intrinsically
good and misery is intrinsically bad, or at least that
happiness is intrinsically better than misery. Can I give
an argument in support of this valuation, deducing it
from more fundamental principles or theories? No, it
seems to me that my valuation is intuitive; or, if you
prefer, it is a primitive notion or a ground floor
consideration. Do I have a comparably strong intuition
supporting the idea that human interests should be
granted a privileged moral status in comparison to
animals' interests? I do not. For one thing, when I renect
on my experientially-grounded sense of the badness of
my misery, it appears to me quite clearly that the badness
nows from the nature of misery, rather than from the
fact that I am the one experieIlcing the misery. To be
sure, the fact that I am the one experiencing the misery
explains why I am the one who is intimately aware of
this particular case of badness. But the misery appears
to me to be bad as such-something which would be
bad for whoever experienced it, including, for example,
a pig. Of course, one could maintain that a pig in fact
cannot experience such misery, but Ulat is anoUler issue,
and one which, in my judgment, Comstock answers
admirably. Alternatively, one might present some
argument for the conclusion that, while pigs do indeed
experience the same sort of misery iliat I experience, it
is not nearly so bad a iliing for the pig to experience it
as it is for me to do so. But this would require argument.
Since what is clearly given in my experience of misery
is iliat the experience of misery as such is seriously bad,
Ule burden of proof is on those who would claim Ulat
sometimes it is not. Given this burden of proof, intuition,
in the absence of argument, will not be sufficient.
My second point in support of Comstock's primitive
notion over Coady's ground noor consideration stems
from ilie observation iliat one of the chief practical
dangers attaching to any appeal to intuition concerns
the ever-present possibility iliat one is confusing the
intuitively evident wiili the merely faIniliar or ilie
culturally given. And yet, surely my experientiallygrounded conclusion that happiness is intrinsically
better Ulan misery nourishes independently of cultural
support and, indeed, would flourish in the face of
cultural opposition. For happiness and misery do not
present themselves with the kind of plasticity or
flexibility necessary for tlleir evaluation to be strongly
susceptible to cultural manipulation. This does not seem
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Notes
1 I add in passing that many people, perhaps most, simply
accept and apply in their lives this extreme double standard;
without ever undertaking to justify it, even to themselves. Jt
is simply a: part of the inherited moral code in maJlY cultures,
and a great number of people evidently neverfind a motive
to question it.

2Cf. the selections by Aquinas, Descartes, and Kant in
Tom Regan and Peter Singer, eds., Animal Rights and
Human Obligations, 2nd ed. (Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice Hall, 1989). '
3 For an example of the first attempt, see Carl Cohen,
"The Case for the Use of Animals in Biomedical Research,"
in Robert M. Baird and Stuart E. Rosenbaum, eds., Animal
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Animal Rights Position," in Baird and Rosenbaum, op. cit.,
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Call for Papers: Eastern, Pacific, Central
The Society for the Study of Etllics & Animals
meets in conjunction with the Division meetings
of the American Philosophical Association. Papers
are hereby invited for all 1994 meetings: Pacific
in Late March, Central in late April, and Eastem in
late December.

A system of blind refereeing is used. Papers must
be ten to fifteen pages long, double spaced. Three
copies are required, with the author's name and
any other identifying information on a separate
title page.
Send papers to:

Papers are welcome on any topic connected with
ethical issues affecting nonhuman animals.
Possible topics include:

Harlan B. Miller, Executive Secretary
Society for the Study of Ethics & Animals
c/o Department of Philosophy
Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University
Blacksburg,VA 24061-0126

• The moral (in)significance of being natural (rather
than domesticated or genetically engineered).
• The consonance (or lack thereof) ofAnimal Liberation Front actions with an animal rights ethic.

Be sure to indicate which meeting is desired.
Volunteers to comment on papers should submit
their names to the same address. Deadlines
(postmark) are as follows:

• Historical studies of conceptions of the moral
standing of animals.
• Animals and the action ethics/virtue ethics
distinction.

1994 Pacific meeting
1994 Central meeting
1994 Eastem meeting

• The importance of animal issues to philosophy
and philosophers.
• Companion animals and paternalism.

September 1, 1993
September 1, 1993
March 15, 1994

Papers accepted for meetings will automatically
be considered for publication in Between the Species.

• The ethics and epistemology of animal research.
• and so on.
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